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Many OECD economies suﬀered a productivity slowdown beginning in the early
1970s. However, the increase in unemployment that followed this slowdown was
more pronounced in European economies relative to the US. In this paper we present
an eﬃciency wage model, which enables us to identify ﬁve channels through which
the productivity slowdown can aﬀect workers’ eﬀort incentives. We argue that this
model can explain the diﬀerent trends in unemployment across countries over this
period in the face of a similar slowdown in productivity. We also demonstrate how
the link between growth and unemployment depends upon labour market institu-
tions in such a way that we can reconcile the mixed empirical results observed in
the literature.
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It is well known that unemployment has risen dramatically in many developed economies
since the early 1970s, while there has been a slowdown in productivity growth over the
same period. To illustrate these trends, Figures 1 and 2 show time series for labour
productivity growth and unemployment, respectively, for a number of economies. One
of the key things to observe in these ﬁgures is that the productivity slowdown has not
obviously been more pronounced in Europe compared to the United States, while the rise
in unemployment has been. This suggests that while there is a relationship between the
two variables1it is not the same in all economies.
This basic property of the data is reﬂected in the ﬁndings of the empirical litera-
ture. For example, Bean and Pissarides (1993) examine cross-country correlations be-
tween unemployment and various measures of productivity growth, for OECD economies.
In general, they ﬁnd no relationship between productivity and unemployment, except
for a mildly negative relationship between 1975 and 1985. In contrast, Caballero (1993)
ﬁnds a weak positive relationship between growth and unemployment in the UK and US
economies between 1966 and 1989. Aghion and Howitt (1992) examine the link between
GDP growth and unemployment for 20 OECD economies and ﬁnd an inverted U-shaped
relationship - that is, economies with either high or low rates of growth enjoyed low
unemployment relative to other economies. Additionally, Muscatelli and Tirelli (2001)
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative correlation between productivity growth and unemployment
for ﬁve of the G7 economies (Japan, Germany, Italy, France and Canada), while for the
1Manning (1992a, p.2) wrote “no story of the general rise in OECD unemployment will be com-
plete without mentioning that the reduction in productivity growth has probably raised the long-run
equilibrium rate of unemployment.”
1US and UK there does not appear to be any signiﬁcant correlation. In general, these
studies seem to imply that there is a negative relationship between productivity growth
and unemployment in Europe2, but that this relationship is positive in the US and UK.
The challenge is, therefore, to construct a coherent model which accounts for this
contrasting experience across diﬀerent countries. To do so, we rely on another key stylized
fact that distinguishes European labour markets from their US counterparts. Empirical
evidence suggests that ﬂows into unemployment in European economies are typically lower
than ﬂows into unemployment in the US (see OECD (1997) for a survey). There is also
evidence that the rate of these ﬂows, in a number of European countries, are lower than
job destruction rates, while the opposite is true in the US and UK (see Boeri (1999), for
example). In other words, workers in European economies are likely to avoid a spell of
unemployment, by ‘directly’ entering a new job when their existing job is destroyed. There
are various possible reasons for these diﬀerences, but the existence of stricter employment
protection legislation in Europe may account for the reluctance of ﬁrms to risk hiring
workers from the pool of the unemployed3. This stylized fact implies that unemployed
workers in Europe are more reliant than their North American counterparts, on the net
creation of new jobs to enable them to exit from unemployment. As a result the European
workers suﬀer from a greater incidence of long-term unemployment, which is a deﬁning
2We characterise the ‘US’ and ‘European’ labor markets as being two polar cases in terms of our
stylised facts. This is obviously a simpliﬁcation as individual countries, such as the UK, lie between the
‘US’ and ‘European’ models. Throughout the paper, ‘Europe’ may therefore be read as consisting of
those European economies which best ﬁt our stylised facts.
3Boeri (op. cit.), presents a theoretical model, and some empirical evidence, that suggests that
imperfect enforcement of job protection legislation may result in employment adjustment taking place
through job-to-job reallocations which do not give rise to a chain of vacancies, and which, therefore,
reduce the probability of the unemployed re-entering the labour market.
2characteristic of the rise in European unemployment. We believe that this is key to
understanding diﬀerent responses of unemployment to the productivity slowdown in the
US and Europe.
To capture this observation, we stress the role of technical progress in creating new jobs
while, at the same time, destroying old ones. Our argument is developed in the familiar
framework of the eﬃciency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1985). As technology
advances, some workers are lucky enough to retain their jobs, but others will be allocated
to new jobs or will become unemployed4. This whole process aﬀects the eﬀort incentives
of workers, and hence the eﬀective labour supply. Our approach, therefore, shifts the
emphasis away from the demand-side of the labour market typically found in the literature
5. We argue that this allows us to reconcile the diﬀerent experiences of OECD economies
in the face of the productivity slowdown, by allowing us to relate changes in worker eﬀort
incentives to both the productivity slowdown and diﬀerences in labour market institutions.
To highlight the incentive eﬀects of the productivity slowdown in the labour market, we
initially assume exogenous technical progress in the form of expanding variety and abstract
from ﬁrms’ hiring and ﬁring decisions operating on the demand side. This allows us to
identify ﬁve channels through which technical innovation aﬀects workers’ eﬀort incentives
within an eﬃciency wage framework. Within these ﬁve eﬀects there are basically two
4Other papers which incorporate eﬃciency wages within a growth model include Phelps (1994), Furuya
(2000), Hoon and Phelps (1997) and van Schaik and de Groot (1998). Our paper diﬀers from these studies
by stressing the important of technical progress as a mechanism of labour reallocation, which, in turn,
aﬀects workers eﬀort incentives.
5Inﬂuential studies in the growth-unemployment literature are Aghion and Howitt (1994), Pissaridis
(1990), Bean and Pissarides (1993), Eriksson (1997), Galor and Lach (1990), Mortensen and Pissarides
(1998), Pissarides (1990) and Postel-Vinay (1998). In these models technical progress creates new jobs
and destroys old jobs, aﬀecting ﬂows into and out of the unemployment pool. This class of models then
capture the hiring and ﬁring decisions of ﬁrms operating on the demand side of the labour market to
explain the link between unemployment and growth. Although workers’ job search is modelled in those
studies, it only plays a secondary role in the technology-unemployment link.
3competing tendencies. Firstly, a productivity slowdown reduces the growth of wage and
non-wage income, cet. par., and, on balance, reduces the value of employment relative
to unemployment. This therefore requires, in equilibrium, an increase in unemployment
to prevent workers from shirking. This net “capitalization” eﬀect makes unemployment
negatively related to growth. At the same time, however, the slowdown in productivity
growth may result in a slower rate of job turnover. We will show that this implies a
higher cost of being unemployed, and hence less unemployment is required to generate
the same level of worker eﬀort. This eﬀect implies that unemployment is positively related
to growth. The paper argues that the greater incidence of job-to-job transfers in Europe
means that the importance of new job creation for these workers is small and therefore
the capitalization eﬀects dominate — the slowdown in productivity growth raises European
unemployment. While in the US and UK, the opposite is true.
Another important implication of our model is that public policies which alter either
the demand and/or supply of labour can change the way growth aﬀects unemployment.
For example, we ﬁnd that generous unemployment beneﬁts make it more likely that
a productivity slowdown will increase unemployment. This implies that the sign of the
relationship between growth and unemployment depends upon institutional factors. That
is, growth and labour market institutions could interact to generate the positive trend
in European unemployment rather than work independently, as some studies implicitly
assume6. This observation relates to another key result of our paper.
A widely-held view, as summarized by Manning (1992a, p.2), is that “it is very hard to
6A notable exception is Daveri and Tabellini (2000) who argue that higher labour taxes caused the
labour productivity slowdown and a sharp increase in European unemployment.
4tell a convincing story for the rise in unemployment in every OECD country based solely on
these explanatory variables [union bargaining power, the generosity of the unemployment
beneﬁt system and perhaps some measure of mismatch].” This view is shared by Acemoglu
(2000a, p.1). We re-examine this dominant view in our supply-side model by introducing
endogenous growth. Speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that a small change in policy parameters
can sometimes have a small eﬀect on equilibrium unemployment, but can sometimes lead
to dramatic and sustained increases in unemployment (and falls in productivity growth).
Whether or not the eﬀects of policy are magniﬁed crucially depends on the degree of labour
market imperfections. Generous unemployment beneﬁts, distortionary labour taxes, and
job protection measures tend to make the magniﬁcation of the eﬀects of policy more likely.
Moreover, the other side of the magniﬁcation of policy eﬀects is a “ratchet eﬀect” in the
sense that the full reversal of policy which increased unemployment may not return it to
the original level. We argue that these results accord with the sustained upward trend in
Europe unemployment.
The present paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a basic model, and Sec-
tion 3 identiﬁes ﬁve eﬀects of technical progress on workers’ incentives to supply eﬀort.
In Section 4, we examine the eﬀect of a slowdown in technical progress on unemploy-
ment. The impacts of public policy are considered, and the relevance of our model in
explaining European unemployment is also discussed. Section 5 then extends the model
by endogenising growth and we establish that a small change in a policy variable can have
am a g n i ﬁed eﬀect on unemployment. Section 6 concludes.
52T h e M o d e l
2.1 Technical Progress
To focus on the impact of technical progress on unemployment we develop a model in
which technical progress induces labour reallocation. As a simple way of doing this, we
consider technical progress in the form of expanding variety where innovations destroy
jobs in old varieties, while creating jobs in new varieties. Initially, we shall assume that
technical progress is exogenous, which, by deﬁnition, means that technology advances
independently of economic factors, and the structure of the product market is irrelevant
for the determination of economic growth. Therefore, for simplicity, we assume perfect
competition in all markets other than the labour market.
There is a continuum of ﬁrms whose measure is one and time is continuous and denoted
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where xj(t), is intermediate good j produced by workers on a one-to-one basis in period





Firms maximize proﬁts by equating the marginal product of labour to the real wage,
7The steady-state growth rate of y is given by gy =( 1− α)g.








where ω(t)=w(t)/n(t)1−α are productivity-adjusted real wages and l(t)=n(t)x(t) is the
total level of employment in the economy. We deﬁne our productivity index as T(t)=
n(t)1−α.
2.2 Labour Reallocation
The number of consumers-cum-workers is normalized to one, and within this population
l(t) workers are employed, while u(t) workers are out of work. A salient feature of technical
progress is that new jobs are created as old jobs are destroyed. To explain how these
features work in our model, consider the labour demand function (3). x(t) equals the
number of workers used to produce a given variety, and it depends on the number of








. The left-hand side is the number of jobs lost in a given
variety in time interval dt. The right-hand side shows that the number of jobs lost is
proportional to the number of jobs that existed with a coeﬃcient determined by the rate
of increase in real wages and technical progress. If none of the workers who are separated
from ﬁrms could ﬁnd jobs elsewhere, −˙ x(t) would be equivalent to the number of workers
becoming unemployed in a given variety. However, in line with the stylized facts discussed
in the introduction, we assume that a fraction η of workers who are separated from ﬁrms
do ﬁnd new jobs elsewhere. Therefore, the number of workers joining the unemployment
7pool from a given variety is −(1 − η) ˙ x(t). Therefore, the probability of a given worker




















where (6) is obtained by using
˙ ω(t)
ω(t) = −(1 − α)
˙ l(t)
l(t) from the labour market condition (4).
When employment l(t) is constant, we have b(t)=( 1− η)g.
Next let us consider the ﬂow of workers into and out of the unemployment pool. The
number of workers becoming unemployed in a given variety during time interval dt is give
by x(t)b(t). Therefore, n(t)b(t)x(t) is the total number of workers becoming unemployed
in an economy as a whole. As regards unemployed workers who ﬁnd jobs, their number
is given by a(t)u(t),w h e r ea(t) is the probability of exiting unemployment at time t.
Therefore, changes in employment during time interval dt are ˙ l(t)=a(t)u(t) − l(t)b(t),
which gives, upon rearrangement,
a(t)=
η˙ l(t)+( 1− η)gl(t)
u(t)
. (7)
2.3 Workers’ Eﬀort Incentives
We now turn to consider how these ﬂows in and out of unemployment aﬀect workers’ eﬀort
incentives. As regards preferences, all workers are identical in that they are risk-neutral
and the intertemporal utility function is time-additive. This implies that the real rate
of interest is given by the rate of time preference, ρ, w h i c hi sc o m m o nt oa l lc o n s u m e r s .
We assume that consumers will consume all their labour income, w(t) as they receive it.
They decide on whether or not to exert work eﬀort when employed. The instantaneous
8utility function when employed is w(t)−εT (t). Consumers suﬀer disutility εT (t) if they
exert eﬀort, while shirking workers do not suﬀer this disutility. (T (t) is the index of the
l e v e lo fp r o d u c t i v i t y ,d e ﬁned above.)
Given these assumptions, the return to a worker from being employed and not shirking,
denoted by V N (t), is deﬁned by the following ‘asset’ equation
ρV
N (t)=w(t) − εT (t)+b(t)
£
V





where V U (t) is the return from being unemployed. This equation says that the interest
rate ρ times asset value V N (t) equals ﬂow beneﬁts (“dividends”) from being an employed
non-shirker. The ﬂow beneﬁts consist of a real wage w(t), a disutility loss through not
shirking εT (t), and expected capital gains/loss. The capital gains/losses arise as workers
move from a state of employment to unemployment at rate b(t) (deﬁn e da b o v e ) ,a n dw h e n
the economy is growing due to technical progress.











Here the worker still enjoys the real wage but without suﬀering the disutility of eﬀort.










zT (t) denotes the opportunity cost of employment, including unemployment beneﬁts.
Since in equilibrium no worker shirks, the only way the worker can re-enter employment
is if a technical innovation creates new jobs. The rate at which workers are selected from
the pool of unemployed for employment is given by a(t), deﬁned above.
92.4 Five Incentive Eﬀects of the Productivity Slowdown
The main objective of this section is to identify ﬁve eﬀects of technical progress on workers’
incentives to provide eﬀort and their implications for equilibrium unemployment. Since
the eﬀort level of a shirker is zero, ﬁrms ensure that workers do not shirk, which requires







where vU(t)=V U(t)/T(t) and vN(t)=V N(t)/T(t) are productivity-adjusted values of




Equations (8) and (9) are then solved for productivity adjusted wages ω(t)=w(t)/n(t)1−α,
giving the individual’s non-shirking condition (NSC):




















ε − ˙ v
N(t) (13)
Taking vU(t) as given and ignoring terms involving time derivatives, there are three chan-
nels through which the productivity growth rate, g,a ﬀects ω(t). First, consider the term
indicated by (i). This channel enters because the productivity slowdown results in de-
creased returns to employment, which workers are less reluctant to give up by being found
to be shirking. Therefore through this channel the productivity slowdown tends to weaken
the disciplinary eﬀect of unemployment. We call this eﬀect the employment capitalization
eﬀect of the productivity slowdown. This is analogous to what Aghion and Howitt (1994)
call the capitalization eﬀect of growth on labour demand, which makes it less proﬁtable
for ﬁrms to hire more workers as the productivity growth slows.
10The second eﬀect is indicated by (ii). This is what we call the job destruction eﬀect
of the productivity slowdown on workers’ eﬀort incentives. The intuition is as follows.
b(t) is the rate at which workers become unemployed, and its inverse 1/b(t) is the average
duration of employment for workers. Further, equation (6) shows that b(t) is increasing in
g. That is, as g decreases, the employment duration rises, strengthening the disciplinary
eﬀect of unemployment. Hence ﬁrms can reduce ω(t).
The third eﬀect, indicated by (iii) in (13), comes from the fact that an employed worker
may ﬁnd a new job elsewhere immediately after being separated from the ﬁrm. Through
this channel, the productivity slowdown tends to shorten the duration of employment
and makes it less costly to be found shirking. This weakens the disciplinary eﬀect of
unemployment, requiring ﬁrms to raise ω(t). We call this channel the job retention eﬀect
of the productivity slowdown. There are other eﬀects which are realized through vU(t).
(13) shows that any eﬀects which raise (or lower) vU(t) tend to increase (or decrease)
ω(t). We turn to those eﬀects next.
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In (14), we can identify the fourth eﬀect of changes in the rate of technical progress, g, on
ω(t), indicated by (iv). A lower g increases the ‘eﬀective’ discount rate that consumers
capitalize future beneﬁts as unemployed. That is, a slowdown in technical progress makes
unemployment a less attractive option. We call this the unemployment capitalization
eﬀect of the productivity slowdown. This eﬀect tends to reduce vU(t), and hence ω(t).
11Note that the unemployment capitalization eﬀect moves in the opposite direction of the
employment capitalization eﬀect identiﬁed above. Since the steady-state ﬂow beneﬁts to
unemployment are necessarily less than the ﬂow beneﬁts from employment, the unem-
ployment capitalization eﬀect will be less than the employment capitalization eﬀect.8
The ﬁfth eﬀect is indicated by (v) in (14). It operates through the job-acquisition rate
a(t) for the unemployed, which is increasing in g. Its inverse 1/a(t) is the average duration
of unemployment. As g falls, this duration rises and, as a result, the disciplinary eﬀect
of unemployment strengthens. This is termed the job creation eﬀect of the productivity
slowdown. Due to this eﬀect, vU falls in (14), and therefore ﬁrms can reduce ω(t). Note
that as less jobs are created, real wages fall. This prediction sharply contrasts studies of
technical unemployment arising from the labour demand side, as they show that less jobs
raise unemployment with a higher wage (see for example Aghion and Howitt (1994)).
2.5 Equilibrium Dynamics
Our assumption that the rate of detection of shirkers is less than inﬁnite means that ﬁrms
need to use a combination of higher wages and unemployment to provide workers with
suﬃcient incentives not to shirk. Using (12), equations (14) and (13) can be rearranged
into
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8If the ﬂow beneﬁts of employment were not greater than the ﬂow beneﬁts when unemployed, then
there would be no disciplining eﬀect from unemployment, and it would be impossible to prevent shirking.
12This is the aggregate NSC. In steady state where ˙ u(t)=0this condition reduces to
ω(t)=z + ε














Figure 3 depicts (16) and the labour demand function (4).
To examine equilibrium dynamics, suppose that initially unemployment is given by
u1.9Proﬁt maximizing behaviour on the part of ﬁrms implies that the economy must be
on the labour demand curve at every point in time, giving ω1. Then, the economy moves
along the labour demand function towards a long-run equilibrium. This analysis implicitly
assumes that the adjustment of employment is not instantaneous. There are two possible
reasons for gradual employment adjustment being a more plausible case, as suggested
by Kimball (1989). First, a jump in aggregate employment requires synchronization
across ﬁrms in both the timing and magnitude of hiring and ﬁring. This seems unlikely in
practice. Second, any adjustment costs would make a discontinuous change in employment
extremely costly.
In fact, Georges (1994) proves that an equilibrium of gradual employment adjustment
is obtained as a unique equilibrium as the adjustment costs go to zero. This result still
applies to our model. In other words, if ﬁrms cannot implement a coordinated, instanta-
neous jump in employment levels to the long-run equilibrium then the adjustment towards
equilibrium will necessarily be protracted. Intuitively, the process of adjustment aﬀects
the probabilities of entering and exiting unemployment and thereby workers’ incentives
to shirk. In Figure 3, as we move toward the new equilibrium real wages are lower than
the new steady-state value as the rising rate of unemployment suppresses the no-shirking
9Note that on oﬀ-steady-state NSC intersects the demand schedule at u1.
13wage required to induce worker eﬀort. This may explain the large degree of persistence
observed in time-series data for unemployment (see, for example, the papers introduced
by Henry et al (2000)).
Note that in the NSC (16), the unemployment and employment capitalization eﬀects
are combined as a single net eﬀect, (i),(iv), as are the (ii) the job destruction eﬀect; (iii)
the job retention eﬀect, and (v) the job creation eﬀect. Also note that the last three eﬀects
(ii), (iii) and (v) are caused via the labour reallocation process. An immediate implication
of this result is that any slowdown in productivity growth which does not result in worker
reallocation will always increase ω(t) due to the net employment capitalization eﬀect.10
3 Comparative Statics
3.1 Productivity Slowdown
We now turn to the long-run impact of a productivity slowdown on unemployment. There
are two competing tendencies aﬀecting the impact of g on the incentives to shirk. Hence
the eﬀect of a productivity slowdown on real wages is, in general, ambiguous. However,
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10All eﬀects due to labor reallocation disappear for η =1 . In (16), this means that l no longer aﬀects
ω. However, this is not true in general. For example, if we assume an exogenous rate of job separation
unrelated to technical progress, ω will be a function of l, and one can easily verify that a lower g increases
ω due to the net employment capitalization eﬀect.
14This shows that there exists a threshold level of unemployment b u below (above) which ω
falls (rises) as the rate of productivity growth falls. This is demonstrated in Figure 4 where
the solid NSC (˙ u =0 ) pivots as a result of a slowdown in the rate of technical progress,
to the dotted curve around a point corresponding to b u . The intuition is simple. We
showed that changes in the rate of technical progress create ﬁve types of eﬀort incentive
eﬀect, the employment capitalization eﬀect, the job destruction eﬀect, the job retention
eﬀect, the unemployment capitalization eﬀect and the job creation eﬀect. However, within
these eﬀects there were basically two competing tendencies. Firstly, eﬀects (i) and (iii)
suggest that slower technical progress reduces the beneﬁts of remaining in employment
and thereby increases the need to prevent shirking through the disciplining eﬀect of a
high rate of unemployment. Second, eﬀects (ii), (iv) and (v) imply that the lower rate
of job separations induced by slower technical progress decrease the incentives to shirk,
and therefore require less unemployment to discipline workers. When unemployment is
suﬃciently high, u>b u,e ﬀects (i) and (iii) dominate eﬀects (ii), (iv) and (v). The opposite
holds for u<b u.
Now it is obvious that a productivity slowdown can positively or negatively aﬀect un-
employment, depending on the position of the (initial) equilibrium unemployment rate u∗
relative to the critical value b u (see Figure 4). If equilibrium unemployment is higher than
b u, a productivity slowdown increases unemployment. On the other hand, unemployment
falls following a productivity slowdown if the equilibrium unemployment rate is lower than
b u. Moreover, the eﬀect that the productivity slowdown has on unemployment tends to
strengthen quantitatively as equilibrium unemployment departs in either direction from
b u. C l e a r l y ,t h ec a s eo fu∗ > b u is consistent with most European countries which suﬀered a
15steep rise in unemployment coupled with the productivity slowdown. We discuss whether
this case is plausible later.
3.2 Determinants of the Growth-Unemployment Link
We have shown that how productivity growth aﬀects unemployment depends crucially on
whether the initial unemployment is greater or smaller than the critical level b u. In other
words, the growth-unemployment link is determined by the relative positions of the ˙ u =0
and labour demand curves.
There are a number of factors, including public policy, which aﬀect the ˙ u =0curve.
Figure 5 examines the case of increasing unemployment beneﬁts (a higher z).11The policy
shifts the ˙ u =0curve leftward, and raises the real wage required to prevent shirking,
increasing unemployment.12An intuition is that the policy makes unemployment relatively
more attractive, creating increased incentives to shirk. Now suppose that the economy
initially has an unemployment rate below the critical value b u,a sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e5 ,s o
that growth and unemployment are positively related in the long-run. After the policy is
in place, unemployment may increase beyond the critical level b u, and the economy goes
into the region where growth increases unemployment. That is, the growth-unemployment
link changes qualitatively due to more generous unemployment beneﬁts.
Next let us consider the eﬀect of labour income tax. Assume that labour income is
taxed at a rate of τ. It can be easily veriﬁed that a higher τ shifts the ˙ u =0curve leftward,
11For simplicity, we ignore the budget constraint facing the government.
12The movement towards the new equilibrium will be gradual as ﬁrms use the rising rate of unem-
ployment during transition to lower the wages paid to workers below the new steady-state level without
compromising the supply of eﬀort.
16as depicted in Figure 5.13Again, it should be clear that the policy may alter the nature of
the growth-unemployment link from the positive relation to the negative one.
The preceding analysis concerns factors which aﬀect the long-run NSC. The quali-
tative nature of how growth aﬀects unemployment also depends on factors operating on
the labour demand side. For example, consider payroll taxes paid by employers. An
increase in the tax rate will reduce the labour demand. Then, starting from the situation
of u<b u, increased payroll taxes may move an economy into the region of u>b u. One
can easily verify this using Figure 5, moving the D curve leftward with the ˙ u =0curve
holding constant. Any factors that aﬀect the position of the labour demand can change
the nature of the growth-unemployment link.14
3.3 Discussion
An important implication of the preceding section is that public policy is an important
determinant of how growth and unemployment are related. In particular, our analysis
suggests that growth and unemployment are more likely to be negatively correlated in
countries where unemployment subsidies are generous, labour income tax is high and
job protection reduces the rate of entry into unemployment. This seems to accord with
the experience of continental European economies. As Figure 1 shows, the productivity
slowdown beginning in the early 1970s took place in both Europe and the US. However, the
13When labour income taxation is introduced, w in the value functions (8) and (9) is multiplied by
1−τ where τ is a tax rate. Therefore, the right hand side of the aggregate NSC (16) is divided by 1−τ,
and consequently the NSC in the ﬁgure shifts upward when τ is raised.
14There are many other factors that may aﬀect the position of the labor demand curve. For example,
increasing wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor as is observed in the UK and the US is
often attributed to increasing globalization and skill-biased technical progress (see, for example, Acemoglu
(2000b)). Both globalization and skill-biased technical progress basically decrease labor demand for
unskilled workers. This issue is formally examined in Leith and Li (2001).
17European labour market witnessed a far stronger increase in the rate of unemployment,
which cannot be explained by diﬀerences in the degree of productivity slowdown.
This observation is strengthened by a stylized fact distinguishing European labour
markets from their US counterparts — the incidence of job-to-job reallocation. As discussed
in the Introduction, a key stylized fact is that European workers are more likely to avoid a
spell of unemployment by ‘directly’ entering a new job when their existing job is destroyed.
This suggests that η, the fraction of workers ﬁnding a job following job separation, is
greater in Europe than in the US. In turn, this implies that the European threshold level
of unemployment b u is relatively smaller than that of the US, cet. par. This means, together
with relatively generous welfare state provisions and high labour taxes, that an equilibrium
unemployment rates in European countries are likely to be larger than the critical level b u.
This generates to the negative correlation between growth and unemployment, as plotted
in Figures 1 and 2 . On the other hand, the US (and the UK to a lesser extent) may be
characterized by an equilibrium unemployment closer or even to the right of the critical
level b u. These diﬀerences may explain contrasting growth-unemployment links in the two
continents, as shown in Figures 1 and 2.15This reasoning seems consistent with what
happened in the both continents.
Another aspect of this result which deserves emphasis lies in the fact that the growth-
unemployment link arises due to interactions between growth and labour market institu-
tions. In contrast, many studies on European unemployment seem to implicitly assume
15More intuitively, in both the US and Europe the productivity slowdown may have reduced the rate
of growth of real wages, and thereby reduced the beneﬁts of employment relative to unemployment cet.
par. However, the increase in unemployment required to induce labour eﬀort in the US as a result of this
slowdown is partially oﬀset by the reduction in labour turnover due to the productivity slowdown. While
in Europe where workers enter a new job fairly quickly anyway, the reduction in technology-induced job
separation is less signiﬁcant and unemployment has to rise by more in Europe to maintain worker eﬀort.
18that institutional arrangements aﬀect unemployment independently of growth or technical
progress and have, instead, attempted to relate these changes in the natural or equilibrium
rate of unemployment to labour market imperfections such as unemployment beneﬁts and
trade union activities (see, for example, Layard et al. (1991)). However, these studies led
Manning (1992) to conclude that while these models can explain short-run movements in
unemployment and some of the cross-country diﬀerences in rates of unemployment, they
cannot fully explain the signiﬁcant rise in European unemployment observed in the past
decades.16
We argue that this failure may be due to the lack of explicit considerations regarding
the interactions between growth and institutional factors which operate on the supply
side of the labour market.17The analysis of such interactions may also provide a key to an
understanding of persistence of high European unemployment in the past decades. In fact,
our model can demonstrate that a “small” change in policy variables, e.g. unemployment
subsidies, can lead to a signiﬁcant rise in unemployment and can explain “ratchet eﬀect”
whereby when a policy that raises unemployment is reversed unemployment remains high.
This is the topic of the next section.
4 Explaining the Persistence of Unemployment
An important feature of European unemployment is the persistence of a relatively high
unemployment rate over decades. Frequently cited explanations of this feature include
hiring and ﬁring costs, capital shortages, insider union membership dynamics, and outsider
16For a discussion of this point, see references in Manning (1992a) and the papers introduced by Henry
et. al (2000).
17Manning (1992) also makes a similar point.
19disenfranchisement (see CEPR (1995)). In the context of the model developed above,
persistent unemployment cannot be explained unless public policy instruments such as
unemployment beneﬁts remain high throughout the period. However, a widely-held view
is that changes in public policy cannot fully explain sustained high unemployment in
Europe. For example, state welfare provisions have become less generous in the UK since
the 1980s, while, until more recently, its unemployment rate remained high.
This section re-visits the issue of policy eﬀects on persistence of unemployment. More
speciﬁcally, we are interested in whether a “small” policy change generates a kind of
“ratchet eﬀect” in the sense that the reversal of the policy shift does not reduce unem-
ployment to an original level. For this purpose, we introduce endogenous growth into the
model developed above.
4.1 Endogenous Growth
First, we derive the labour market equilibrium condition, using the aggregate NSC (15)























This equation deﬁnes equilibrium unemployment rate as a function of productivity growth
g. In this sense, this condition captures the link running from growth to unemployment.
The curve representing ˙ u =0is depicted in Figures 6(a) and 6(b). It is monotonically
increasing for u<b u, and falling for u>b u with g going oﬀ to inﬁnity at b u.
Second, to endogenise productivity growth, we require another condition which deﬁnes
the link running from unemployment to growth. Since we are not interested in the source
20of endogeneity of long-run growth (but its consequence), we make an assumption as
simple as possible. Technical progress is assumed to be driven by learning-by-doing in a
serendipitous way according to
g = g (1 − u),g
0 > 0,g (1) < ∞,g (0) = 0. (19)
This means that production activities generate new insights of how goods are produced,
leading to productivity improvement.18
The equilibrium values of u and g are determined by two conditions (18) and (19), as
shown in Figures 6(a) and 6(b). Note that the growth equation (19) must hold at each
point in time, so that the economy moves along the g (1 − u) line before it reaches steady
state. It can also be easily veriﬁed that the unemployment rate tends to move away from
steady state in the directions indicated by arrows. Figure 6(a) shows the case where
the long run equilibrium unemployment rate u∗ is smaller than the critical value b u. Note
that the shaded area is irrelevant, since starting from this area is infeasible 19. A similar
interpretation holds for Figure 6(b).20It should be clear that a long-run equilibrium is
u n i q u ef o rt h ec a s eo fu∗ < b u,a st h e˙ u =0and g(1 − u) curves have slopes with diﬀerent
signs. In contrast, both curves are monotonically falling in the case of u∗ > b u. Therefore,
18Note that (19) assumes that unemployment negatively aﬀects growth, i.e. recessions are bad for long-
run growth. This plausible relation is ﬁrst mentioned by King and Rebelo (1988) and stressed by Stadler
(1990) in his business cycles model. There are a number of models where learning-by-doing leads to the
negative unemployment-growth link as an endogenous outcome, including Van Ewijk (1997) and Martin
and Rogers (1997). However, one does not need to literally take the learning-by-doing interpretation of
(19). It can be regarded as a reduced-form equation derived from more sophisticated assumptions. In
fact, the basic results detailed below do not signiﬁcantly change even if technical progress is driven by
deliberate proﬁt-seeking R&D (in which case the NSC should be modiﬁed to take into account R&D
workers).
19Starting from u>b u would require a vertical or inverted NSC (see Figure 3), which is impossible
given the assumptions made.
20The long-run unemployment rate can coincide with the critical value b u. Figure 6 does not apply to
this case. However, it can be veriﬁed that the long-run equilibrium is unique and stable. Since this is an
uninteresting case, it will not be discussed further.
21in general an odd number of equilibria exist in this case.21This property is exploited to
explain a steep rise in unemployment in the coupled with the productivity slowdown of
the recent past.
4.2 Policy Eﬀects Can Be Magniﬁed
There are several explanations for a dramatic rise in European unemployment, including
generous unemployment beneﬁts and high taxes. However, it is generally accepted that,
on their own, these factors can explain only a relatively small part of the rise in unemploy-
ment. In contrast, we will show that a “small” policy shift (or alternatively exogenous
shocks) can generate a dramatic impact on unemployment through the channels detailed
in this paper.
We ﬁrst examine the conventional case where a policy shift creates only a “small”
increase in unemployment. Consider the case of u∗ < b u,d e p i c t e di nF i g u r e6 ( a ) .L e tu s
examine, as an example, the eﬀect of a higher level of unemployment beneﬁts. The policy
shifts the ˙ u =0curve downward, reducing growth and increasing unemployment. This
qualitative result is commonly found in labour market models. What is worth stressing,
however, is that the impact of the policy on unemployment (and growth) is “small” in
the sense that a long-run equilibrium unemployment rate changes “continuously” as the
policy changes.
However, this result is reversed in the case of u∗ > b u, which we argued above is more
relevant to the European experience. In this case, there can be multiple equilibria. To
21This is because the ˙ u =0curve goes to inﬁnity as u → b u from above and cuts the horizontal axis at
a point less than one.
22explore the implications of multiple equilibria, consider Figure 7 where the ˙ u =0curve
initially intersects the g (1 − u) curve at three points, E1,E 0
1 and E00
1. To highlight our
argument, suppose that the economy is initially at a point E1 where growth is relatively
high and unemployment is low. To ﬁx our idea, one may wish to consider E1 as corre-
sponding to the European situation in the early 1970s. Starting from this point, let us
examine the eﬀect of higher unemployment subsidies. The policy shifts the curve upward,
as illustrated by two dotted curves. Initially, the policy merges points E1 and E0
1 into
E2. Thus the economy moves to E2, resulting in lower growth and higher unemployment.
Qualitatively, the impact of the policy shift is still “small” in the afore-mentioned sense
since the long-run equilibrium changes “continuously.” This may represent the period
of the early 1970s where an upward pressure on unemployment rate built up gradually.
Now let us further increase unemployment beneﬁts. Then, the low unemployment growth
equilibrium E2 disappears, and there is a unique long-run equilibrium with a higher un-
employment rate. That is, changes in the long-run equilibrium involve discontinuity. In
this sense, the impact of the policy is “large” due to the feedback eﬀects of endogenous
growth. A movement from E2 to E3 may represent the period of late 70s and 80s when
the unemployment rate rose sharply. Although the above analysis focused on unemploy-
ment subsidies in highlighting the key mechanism, other policies, such as a higher labour
income tax, qualitatively generate the same result.
Conventional wisdom suggests that the combination of several diﬀerent factors gener-
ated a steep increase in unemployment. Indeed, an upward shift of the ˙ u =0curve as
depicted in Figure 7 can be caused by a higher interest rate ρ and a negative productivity
(level) shock (a downward shift of labour demand). Moreover, the low unemployment
23equilibrium E1 c a na l s od i s a p p e a ri nF i g u r e7d u et oad o w n w a r ds h i f to ft h eg (1 − u)
curve for a given ˙ u =0curve. Such a downward shift could be caused by a fall in the
average skill-level of the labour force (see OECD (1994, Ch.7)), which reduces the eﬀect
of learning-by-doing (or lower R&D productivity). These are all cited as contributing
factors to rising unemployment. A key message of this analysis is that the combination
of “small” changes in policy or other exogenous factors makes it even more likely that
unemployment rises very sharply due to discontinuous changes in the long-run equilibrium
when u∗ > b u . This, as we argued above, is relevant to the Europe experience.
4 . 3 P e r s i s t e n tU n e m p l o y m e n tD u et oR a t c h e tE ﬀects
Europe’s welfare state provisions did not become signiﬁcantly more generous between
the 1960s and the 1980s. Despite this, European unemployment witnessed a dramatic
rise and remained persistently high. This observation generally contributed to a view
that the generosity of welfare state can account for only a part of persistent European
unemployment. We re-examine this issue. In particular, we demonstrate that our model
exhibits ratchet eﬀects which leave unemployment high even after the policy is reversed.
In fact, the ratchet eﬀects are the other side of the policy eﬀect magniﬁcation discussed
in the preceding section.
Consider unemployment beneﬁts for illustrative purposes. An equilibrium E3 in Figure
7 was achieved after the policy moved a long-run equilibrium from E1 to E3. Now suppose
that the policy is removed. Initially equilibrium moves to E0
2 a f t e rap a r t i a lr e v e r s a lo f
the policy. If the policy is fully reversed, the ˙ u =0curve moves back to the solid curve,
and a long-run equilibrium E00
1 is achieved. Note that the economy does not revert back
24to the starting equilibrium E1. As aggregate employment changes only gradually, so does
unemployment, and the economy is “trapped” in a high unemployment equilibrium even
after the policy is fully withdrawn.
The only way to attain the starting equilibrium E1 is to reduce unemployment beneﬁts
further suﬃciently below the initial level. In Figure 7, it means that the ˙ u =0curve
shifts leftward to the extent that a long-run equilibrium become unique, so that a high
unemployment equilibrium is eliminated. This explains why reducing unemployment is
so costly.
A crucial element of the ratchet eﬀects and the policy eﬀect magniﬁcation discussed
above is the existence of multiple equilibria. In turn, it depends on the degree of non-
linearity of the ˙ u =0and g (1 − u) curves. How plausible are the requirements of such
non-linearity for long-run multiple equilibria? At the current degree of abstraction, it is
diﬃcult to answer this question. However, the existence of high and low unemployment
equilibria is one plausible line of research which can explain the persistence of high unem-
ployment.22In fact, Manning (1992b) provides evidence that the rise in unemployment in
Britain in the 1980s can be plausibly viewed as a move from a low- to a high-equilibrium
unemployment rate.
It is also worth mentioning that the ratchet eﬀe c ta sa nu n e m p l o y m e n tp e r s i s t e n c e
mechanism is diﬀerent from Saint-Paul (1995b) who also developed a dynamic eﬃciency
wage model. In his model, intertemporally proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms take eﬃciency wages
as costs of adjusting employment before a long-run equilibrium is reached. In our model,
this aspect is not relevant to the ratchet eﬀects, and in contrast to Saint-Paul, our model
22For example, see Diamond (1982) and Saint-Paul (1995a).
25explains persistent unemployment as a long-run equilibrium.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Many authors have sought to explain the rise in European unemployment by examining
the concurrent productivity slowdown. However, empirical studies that present cross-
country evidence on this link tend to ﬁnd very mixed results. This paper provides a
theoretical explanation of the link between growth and unemployment that focuses on
the supply-side of the labour market. This focus is in contrast to the usual emphasis in
theoretical work on the demand side. We ﬁnd that key characteristics of the European
labour market -and in particular the high rates of job-to-job labour reallocation observed
in Europe - mean that we are far more likely to ﬁnd a negative relationship between
growth and unemployment in Europe than in the UK or US.
Speciﬁcally, we identify ﬁve diﬀerent eﬀects of technical progress on workers’ incentives
to supply eﬀort. These eﬀects work in opposite directions and oﬀset each other, depending
upon the structure of the labour market. In both the US and Europe the productivity
slowdown could be expected to have reduced the rate of growth of real wages, and thereby
reduced incentives to provide eﬀort due to the reduced beneﬁts of employment relative
to unemployment cet. par. However, the increase in unemployment required to induce
labour eﬀort in the US following this slowdown is partially oﬀset by the reduction in labour
turnover that the slower rate of technical progress also implies. While in Europe, where
workers can often expect to by-pass a signiﬁcant spell of unemployment, the reduction in
technology induced job separation is less important to workers currently in employment
26and unemployment has to rise by more in Europe to maintain worker eﬀort. Moreover, we
demonstrate that once endogenous growth is taken into account, our model can account
for both the sharp rise in European unemployment and its persistence. We argue that
these ﬁndings conﬁrm our view that the demand side of the labour market can only give
a partial picture of the link between technical progress and unemployment, and a deeper
understanding of the issues involved requires an analysis of the supply-side.
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Figure 1: Productivity Growth Rates (%) in various OECD economies. The data has
been smoothed using four year moving averages adn data for Germany post reuniﬁcation
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Figure 2: Unemployment rates in various OECD economies. Source: OECD Economic




























Figure 5: The Eﬀects of Unemployment Beneﬁts and Labour Income Tax
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Figure 6(a): Endogenous Growth when u<b u
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Figure 6(b): Endogenous Growth for u>b u














Figure 7: The Magniﬁcation and ‘Ratcheting’ of Policy Eﬀects.
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